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Abstract
This report explores scholarship at the interface of geography and law engaging with the concept of evidence.
As with the first two reports, this is not a summary of a predefined field, but rather a consideration of how
ideas of what constitutes evidence have been differentially understood across geographical and cognate
studies. The discussion spans work that has considered the formal barriers to the production of evidence at
trials, the politics of silencing certain evidential practices and interpretive questions relating to claims of
expertise.
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I Introduction
The aftermath of the shooting down of Malay-
sian Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 in
eastern Ukraine inverted established protocols
of evidence gathering. The initial crash scene,
attended by television crews and journalists,
showed a scene of devastation where bodies and
materials were strewn across the countryside
around the village of Hrabove in Donetsk
Oblast, Ukraine. Considering the scale of the
destruction, international observers suggested
that state military involvement would have been
required and allegations soon circulated that
Russian-backed military groups could have
been responsible (Carson, 2014). But where it
may be expected that a state or international
investigation would gather evidence that could
form the basis of a legal trial – and thereby enter
the public domain – in this instance, it was the
public that initiated aspects of the evidence
gathering. One of the reasons for this inversion
was the posting by Ukrainian Interior Minister
Aven Avakov of a video that showed a BUK M-
1 missile launcher – of the type suspected of
responsibility – moving through an urban land-
scape. Sienkiewicz (2015: 209) describes the
short clip:
[ . . . ] a road, dimly lit, sits momentarily vacant.
Trees rustle in the fore and background. A bill-
board looms, mostly obscured. Five seconds in, a
military truck rolls by, moving left to right. The
camera shakes and pans to keep the vehicle on
screen. After a quick zoom, the truck exits the
frame and the clip, all 13 seconds of it, ends. To
the average Facebook user, the video appears
amateur and, above all, trivial.
But to other Internet users, it was far from
trivial: the investigative agency Bellingcat cor-
roborated the Avakov video with Google Earth
data and CCTV and dashcam feeds, allowing
the journey of the missile launcher to be traced
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from Russian territory into eastern Ukraine and
then back again (Bellingcat, 2015). This was a
meticulous process of connecting the material-
ity of the launcher with its distinguishing fea-
tures (such as an empty missile bay on its return)
with the nuances of the Ukrainian and Russian
landscape (whether the buildings, street signs,
road markings, advertisements or topographic
features). Avakov’s purpose for posting the
video is not immediately clear, but presumably
he would have been aware of the location and
nature of the material he was putting online.
Sienkiewicz’s (2015) suggestion is that the
posting was a deliberate act to enrol open source
investigators who would perform the task of
corroborating the evidence while broadcasting
the subsequent findings to an international
audience.
Bellingcat’s work could be taken as an exam-
ple of the democratisation of evidence produc-
tion, where the monopoly of sanctioned legal
investigators is broken by the availability of
open source data. But this would be to overlook
the myriad ways in which state and corporate
actors have sought to mobilise precisely such
crowd sourced intelligence practices to bolster
their own narratives and agendas (see Trottier,
2015; Weizman, 2017). Indeed, the Bellingcat
investigation cannot be seen as entirely severed
from state interests, both due to the funding of
its activities (by donors such as the US’s
National Endowment for Democracy) and the
processes through which its investigations –
such as the MH17 materials – are utilised by
state actors to justify later criminal investiga-
tions (Sienkiewicz, 2015: 218). Rather, the les-
son from this case is both broader and more
consequential. At the heart of the example of
the MH17 investigation is the transformation
of seemingly inconsequential materials – the
logo on a billboard or the positioning of a spoil
heap – into evidence. Their digital imprints no
longer disjointed pieces of data but through their
assembling as a narrative their connections are
brought to the fore, thereby shaping public
understanding of what took place in eastern
Ukraine (Ingram, 2019). Such a process illumi-
nates the necessarily relational nature of evi-
dence, where its existence is a function of its
probative capacity, its proposed invocation of
an event.
It is this process of conversion, so central to
both law and science’s claims to truth, that is the
focus of this third progress report on legal geo-
graphy. As with work on court materiality (Jef-
frey, 2019) or bodies and law (Jeffrey, 2020a), a
series of disciplinary perspectives intersect
when studying evidence. One starting point
would be to consider the formal, legal, question
of the geography of evidence as it maps onto
jurisdiction. Legal scholars will in the early
stages of their tuition be told that evidence is
information by which facts tend to be proved
(Saks and Thompson, 2003). Any adversarial
legal process is a dispute over facts in issue and
the different actors within a trial seek to marshal
evidence to support their position. To regulate
the supply of evidence, the legal authority
applies a law of evidence to regulate the mate-
rials, testimony and information that are appro-
priate for legal deliberation (Keane and
McKeown, 2018: 2). Consequently, there is
growing work in the field of legal studies tracing
how contrasting approaches to the law of evi-
dence, and the very notion of ‘proof’, can be
mapped onto the territorialisation of legal
regimes (Cheah, 2019). This is particularly sig-
nificant when considering the distinctions
between legal systems led by a professional
judiciary versus the use of a lay jury, a schism
that shapes questions of admissibility and estab-
lished barriers to the admission of certain types
of evidence (Damaška, 1997). In recent years,
the imagination of a neat territorial backdrop to
laws of evidence has been challenged through
the greater institutionalisation of international
law, a process that has prompted considerable
innovation in the gathering, interpretation and
admission of evidence (Freeman, 2018; Wang,
2020).
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But in addition to the geography of the law of
evidence, evidence has its own geography. Over
the past two decades, there has been a metho-
dological and epistemological shift in legal geo-
graphy to embrace qualitative approaches that
bring to the fore the processual nature of law
(Bennett and Layard, 2015; Braverman, 2014;
Delaney, 2015). It is not enough, then, to simply
note the differences in doctrinal approaches to
admissibility across space we need to think of
how questions of place, embodiment and mate-
riality intersect in the conversion of matter or
speech into evidence. Such approaches high-
light inter alia the mundane barriers to the pro-
vision of evidence (Gill et al., 2020), the
gendered nature of evidence production (Hun-
ter, 1996) and the ways in which settler colonial
legal system privilege certain claims to truth
(Blomley, 2015; Pahuja, 2011). As with the
innovations of international law, we can also
trace the role of technological and legal changes
in shaping the geographies of evidence, as glo-
bal financial crime, cybercrime and emerging
forensic techniques open new possibilities for
where, what and how evidence is performed
(Gregory, 2018; Sharp, 2020).
But in addition to these first two approaches,
there is a third consideration that needs to be
incorporated into this report: that geography is
evidence. There has been a long association
between geographical knowledge and the pro-
duction of law; 19th-century practices of carto-
graphy and exploration were bound into the
establishment of new forms of colonial author-
ity over landscapes and nature (Livingston,
2010). Hence, when examining the production
of evidence, we need to consider how geogra-
phical knowledge, both environmental and
social, becomes the evidential base of legal pro-
cesses (Brodsky, 2003; De Vorsey, 1980; Mor-
gan and Bull, 2007). This readily strays into a
set of debates concerning the implications of
closer relationships between geographical
inquiry and the evidential demands of legal pro-
cesses, a set of reflections that intersects with
questions relating to the identity and coherence
of geography as a professional practice (Kuus,
2020; Ward, 2005).
The conversion of matter and speech to evi-
dence is, then, an intentional process that cre-
ates hierarchies between the included (on the
grounds of its admissibility, presence or claims
to expertise) and the excluded. Thinking
through this process demands engaging with a
wider legal and epistemological question of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove a
fact. Unsurprisingly, this is a point of sustained
legal deliberation (e.g. Calvert, 1959) and
becomes a particular concern in trials which
either centre on two contrasting testimonies
(creating the ‘justice gap’ in rape convictions,
see Brown, 2011) or situations where evidence
is hard to gather (such as international criminal
trials, see Braga da Silva, 2020). This report
therefore narrows its focus onto one specific
aspect concerning legal geographical debates:
the barriers to sufficient evidence. In this sense,
I am keen to take forward Orzeck and Hae’s
(2020) call for a legal geography that is attentive
to both the contingencies of (human and non-
human) agency and the determining effects of
legal structures. Evidence is a scarce resource,
but it is a scarcity that is shaped by both its
production (barriers to admissibility or financial
restrictions to investigative work), the legal pro-
cess itself (technical questions regarding the
presentation of evidence), authority (what
counts as meaningful evidence) and interpreta-
tion (how are materials or statements under-
stood as relating to the facts in issue). Work
examining these elements of scarcity are con-
sidered below, under the headings of admissi-
bility, absence, authority and expertise.
II Admissibility
At the heart of a judicial process, facts are in
dispute and the role of the trial is to provide a
setting in which evidence may be presented and
weighed (either by lay observers, a judicial
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panel, injured parties or community representa-
tives) resulting in a judgement. This rather sche-
matic account of law supports Jasanoff’s (2012:
191) practical point that ‘the ultimate goal of
courts is the attainable one of dispensing justice,
not the impossible one of finding objective
truth’. To function, courts use laws of evidence
to manage rules concerning the gathering, stor-
ing and presentation of evidence within trials
(Calvert, 1959). The overriding purpose of such
rules is to ensure due process with the objective
that trials meet fundamental standards of fair-
ness and justice (Freeman, 2018). But claims of
standardisation should not be mistaken for any
clear agreement as to the nature of appropriate
evidence: laws of evidence vary across time and
space and have often developed in an ad hoc
fashion to respond to legal precedent, shifting
moral contexts and the changing nature of poten-
tial – digital, forensic or environmental – eviden-
tial material (Wang, 2020). Unsurprisingly, then,
questions of procedure, admissibility and
evidential weight have become key concerns at
the interface of legal studies and geographical
research.
Despite differences, a central role of all laws
of evidence is setting the process through which
evidence may be admitted to the legal process.
Usually, it is the responsibility of the presiding
judge as to whether a piece of evidence may be
considered on the basis of whether or not it is
relevant to the facts of the case (Guthrie et al.,
2000). There is considerable legal debate as to
how ‘relevance’ is defined as it is a term that by
necessity reflects an individual judgement as to
the connections between the evidential material
and the facts in dispute (for a discussion, see
Tapper, 2010). In legal terms, relevance is
assessed through the ‘probative potential of an
item of information to support or negate the
existence of a fact of consequence’ (Damaška,
1997: 55) and debates concerning admissibility
are aired at pretrial hearings and through prose-
cutorial reports. As many studies have revealed,
this is by no means a technical exercise in
classifying the value of available materials (see
Gallai, 1999). The experience of the availability
of new types of evidence to prosecuting author-
ities is instructive, such as the case in the 1980s
of DNA identification in US courts. As Blair
(1990: 859–860) outlines, this process involved
the corroboration of this new technique with
existing scientific methods:
The court identified several factors that could
help establish the reliability of scientific evidence
with no established “track record” in litigation.
These factors included the relationship of the new
technique to more established modes of scientific
analysis, the nonjudicial uses to which the tech-
nique is put, the existence of a specialized body of
literature dealing with the technique, and the fre-
quency with which the technique leads to erro-
neous results.
The judgement here rests on the connection
between DNA evidence and ‘established sci-
ence’. As I will discuss later in the article, this
relies upon a particular imagination of science
and reliability, structured around the credentials
of peer-review, scholarly recognition and prior
achievement (Good, 2003). Thus the issue of
admissibility, and the wider question of the
presence or absence of evidence, illuminates the
fraught process through which materials stake a
claim to evidential status while the selection of
evidence can reify unequal relations between
participants in a legal process.
There are many different justifications
offered for the inadmissibility of evidence. One
justification for restrictions to admissibility lies
in the increasing use of a jury within legal pro-
cedures (in common law), a process that has
been argued to foster ‘a paternalistic and pro-
tective attitude, excluding relevant evidence
such as hearsay evidence, evidence of character,
and the opinion evidence of non-experts on the
basis that lay persons might overvalue its weight
and importance, or even treat it as conclusive’
(Keane and McKeown, 2018: 3). The restriction
concerning admissibility reveals a curious
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ambiguity, whereby trial by jury is enshrined
from its early medieval roots as a bulwark
against excessive power of the sovereign, but
the jury’s absence of legal training acts as jus-
tification for sovereign control over the presen-
tation of evidential materials (Linebaugh,
2008). Evidence in these circumstances must
be legally ‘relevant’ while also publicly
persuasive.
There are a number of practices of translation
– or interpretation – that scholars have identi-
fied in this process of proving relevance. The
first is the need for expert evidence to be pre-
sented in such a way as to be intelligible to the
judge. In her account of the changing use of
digital evidence in international law, Freeman
(2018: 320) notes the increasing use of ‘demon-
strative evidence’ including diagrams, maps,
drawings, graphs, animation, simulations and
models, which act as ‘information to help the
judges better understand the evidence, [it is] not
evidence per se’. As a second stage of interpre-
tation, Morgan and Bull (2007: 44) note in rela-
tion to the use of forensic geoscience evidence
that while the judge will decide the admissibil-
ity of evidence, ‘it is the jury, that body of lay
persons (who are not necessarily conversant
with scientific theory or even jargon), who must
be led through the intricacies of geoforensics (or
any other scientific discipline) pertinent to the
case’. Citing Kirk (1974: 2), they go on to
emphasise the significance of interpretation in
the case of physical evidence, arguing that such
evidence ‘cannot be wrong; it cannot perjure
itself; it cannot be wholly absent. Only in its
interpretation can there be error. Only human
failure to find, study and understand it can
diminish its value’ (Morgan and Bull, 2007: 52).
Studies of international law, a field that has
constituted a laboratory for evidential innova-
tion, have highlighted how new types of evi-
dence have required particular emphasis on
authentication in the process of establishing
admissibility. One example is Freeman’s
(2018) account of the twin investigations into
the 2005 Beirut explosion that killed the former
Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafic Hariri: one a
United Nations inquiry that sought to gather
witness testimony and analyse the forensics
around the incident, and a local police investi-
gation that examined cell phone records to trace
activity around Hariri. The findings of the latter
investigation established Hariri had been fol-
lowed in the months and days leading up to the
explosion and the nature of the communications
could point to a hierarchy within the group. At
the time such analysis of call data records
coupled with geolocation data was new, and
expert evidence was called by the Prosecution
to explain how cellular signal and cell tower
sites are used to geolocate the cell phone user.
Here we see the relational nature of evidence,
where the relevance of phone data becomes
apparent through its narration by experts to the
judiciary (Freeman, 2018: 313). Hence by con-
sidering questions of admissibility, scholars
have illuminated the relational nature of evi-
dence: its relevance is often secured through the
corroboration, or explanation, provided by other
forms of evidence.
III Absence
The presence or absence of evidence is not sim-
ply a consequence of admissibility rules. Recent
scholarship in legal geography and elsewhere
has involved a methodological turn towards an
empirical engagement with the unfolding of
legal procedures as material and embodied
enterprises (Cuomo and Brickell, 2019; Gill and
Good, 2019; Jeffrey 2020b). This diverse body
of work, influenced variously by the postmo-
dern sociology of de Sousa Santos (1987), the
materialist and ethnographic perspective
offered by Latour (2010) or Butler’s (2011)
approach to performativity, seeks to foreground
the ways in which attention to the actual unfold-
ing of legal processes illuminates hitherto over-
looked barriers to the fulfilment of justice. A
recent powerful example is provided by Gill
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et al. (2020) in their study of asylum appeals
hearings in Europe, work that illustrates how
the arrangement of legal proceedings – the com-
pilation of evidence, the spatial organisation of
the hearings and the arrangement of who can
speak when – shapes the outcomes of cases and
the attitudes of participants as to whether justice
has been served. Evidence lies at the heart of
these deliberations, and it is worth quoting their
findings at length:
Many of the hearings we observed turned on doc-
umentary evidence, and we became aware of a
diverse and contested spatial political economy
of the assembling of evidence to support asylum
claims. Many times, apparently crucial pieces of
documentary evidence – letters, photographs, cer-
tified copies of documents and medical or educa-
tional certificates – were reported as missing or
partial: lost, spoiled, mislaid, untranslated,
incomplete or is understood. So pronounced was
this issue in the UK that considerable time was
spent deciphering what was missing or included
in judges’ and lawyers’ documents. Of 240 nor-
mal hearings, we calculate that 9% of time was
devoted to such discussions. Many cases that
experienced these issues were also adjourned,
illustrating the agency of documentary evidence
in absentia: of 48 adjournments we saw, 22 were
because documentary evidence was missing. (Gill
et al., 2020: 13)
Here we see what can be understood as the
mundane administration of law entering into the
substantive process of achieving justice. In par-
ticular, this account speaks of the considerable
time costs connected to the poor administration
of evidence, increasing the possibility of rushed
decisions at a later date or exhaustion among
trial participants, which itself can evoke nega-
tive public perceptions (see Grunstein and
Banerjee, 2007).
We could consider many legal scenarios
where the absence of evidence limits the possi-
bility of trial justice. Among other factors,
witness intimidation (O’Flaherty and Sethi,
2010), the fear of revisiting traumatic events
(Brounéus, 2008) or the destruction of incrimi-
nating material (Domańska, 2020) all contribute
to the possibility of insufficient evidence to pur-
sue a criminal trial. One area where there is
increasing attention to evidential insufficiency
relates to the prosecution of international
crimes, where territorial jurisdiction of evi-
dence gathering practices places limits on inter-
national investigative agencies. In relation to
crimes against humanity, we have seen many
examples in recent years of alleged perpetrators
blocking the gathering of potential evidence
either by failing to guarantee the security of
officials, destroying crime scenes or withdraw-
ing from multilateral legal agreements, such as
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (see Jones, 2016; Morrissey,
2017). In addition, research is beginning to trace
the challenges posed by new practices of global
financial criminality and cybercrime for the col-
lection of evidence, where crime is both dema-
terialised though electronic transactions and
communication though remaining obdurately
wedded to the territorial jurisdiction of states,
with varying approaches to laws of investiga-
tion and evidence (see Blažič and Klobučar,
2020).
IV Authority
Extending beyond the material question of the
presence or absence of evidence, geographers
have investigated how the paternalistic nature
of admissibility rules is part of a wider structure
of power within the operation of law. There is an
established asymmetry written into criminal
procedures between the prosecuting authority
(with control over investigative functions) and
the defendant (unable to insert evidence into
legal proceedings as the trial unfolds). This hier-
archy is stretched in situations – such as indi-
genous rights claims – where there is a
fundamental dispute as to the terms of justice.
In examining the early stages of the Wet’suwe-
t’en and Gitxsan peoples land claim dispute
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with the Canadian government, Sparke (2005:
14) cites Satsan, a Wet’suwet’en chief, who
interpreted the legal process as fundamentally
uneven: ‘we were entering a game in which we
had no involvement whatsoever with the putting
together of that game, the making up of the
rules, in the appointment of referees or
umpires’.
It is this structural inequality that under-
pins Blomley’s (2015) later account of the
same status of lands question, where the
authorities in British Columbia were seeking
to transfer land under Aboriginal title to a
reduced area held as a form of ‘fee simple’
(permanent and absolute tenure of land in a
freehold tenure). In doing so, Blomley argues
the Canadian legal system ‘bracketed’ certain
modes of land ownership, and in this case the
concept of property as an individually held
asset, setting alternative – collective, non-
transferable – relationships between bodies
and land outside of the adjudication of law.
This form of inadmissibility ‘entails the
drawing of a boundary that marks an inside,
that is detached or disentangled from that
now identified as outside’ (Blomley, 2015:
169). The suggestion is that the prime pur-
pose of the treaty negotiations is stabilising a
property regime, as opposed to confronting
the injustices of a ‘grudging and asymmetric
exercise conducted on the terms set by a
powerful settler society’ (Blomley, 2015:
175).
Through these examples we see the ‘brack-
eting’ of certain social and cultural norms
within the operation of law, in so doing reify-
ing asymmetrical cultural and legal norms. A
similar exercise of authority has been identi-
fied in work that has illuminated the gendered
nature of evidence production, where patriar-
chal and masculinist norms are reproduced
within trials. For example, feminist legal scho-
larship has argued that evidence laws, and
therefore the production and treatment of evi-
dence, operate ‘systematically to the advantage
of men and the disadvantage of women’ (Hun-
ter, 1996: 127). For example, when discussing
the admissibility of previous sexual or violent
conduct, Hunter (1996: 132) exposes the his-
toric differences in treatment between com-
plainant and defendant:
[r]esearch for this Article uncovered little discus-
sion and few examples of the possibility that a
rape complainant’s sexual history might be
excluded on the ground that it was more prejudi-
cial than probative. By way of contrast, judges
have excluded evidence of the male defendant’s
sexual history in rape cases and evidence of the
history of violence in domestic murder cases on
grounds of prejudice, even though this evidence
might be highly relevant in establishing the defen-
dant’s state of mind.
The sense of ‘judicial sympathy for allegedly
violent men and presumptively sexually active
women’ (Hunter, 1996: 133) is reflected beyond
the technical procedures of evidence law and
enters qualitative accounts of trial experiences.
For example, there is a considerable literature
examining the retraumatising effects of giving
testimony in cases of sexual violence, where
male defence lawyers or defendants can launch
invasive cross-examination and force survivors
to relive their experiences (for analysis, see
Kebbell et al., 2003). In their examination of the
trials after the conflict in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Jeffrey and Jakala (2014: 664) connect this
sense of retraumatisation to the theatricality of
court spaces where the practice of testifying was
described by one witness as a form of ‘expo-
sure’ ‘where their credibility was under scrutiny
both during the trial process and later within
their local communities, as word spread that
they had been to the Court’. Research has found
that one implication of such social and psycho-
logical harm is that evidence is not forthcoming
and sexual violence is therefore under-reported
while experiencing low conviction rates (Coun-
douriotis, 2013).
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V Expertise
As we have seen, evidence in law does not pre-
exist the legal deliberation: it is forged through
contestation over its relevance and weight.
Where this process involves recourse to techni-
cal, scientific or specialist information, experts
are required to interpret the meaning of a piece
of evidence to either the judiciary or jury by
explaining how scientific data relate to the facts
in issue. The recourse to expertise poses an ini-
tial challenge since – as with many extralegal
circumstances – there is no universally accepted
accreditation for what constitutes expertise. As
Keane and McKeown (2018: 583) lament the
absence in the context of the UK justice system
of ‘any scheme of compulsory accreditation or
registration for expert witnesses’ or ‘practical
training for judges and practitioners in under-
standing expert evidence and assessing its likely
reliability’. It falls on judges to assess whether a
witness has sufficient credentials to perform the
function of expert witness and inevitably this
judgement is questioned by legal representa-
tives on the opposing side, either at the pretrial
or trial stages.
Once selected as a suitable ‘expert’, attention
turns to the question of interpretation: specifi-
cally how scientific data are narrated as evi-
dence (see Good, 2003). At the heart of this
second stage of deliberation is the beguiling
concept of forensics, a term that has its roots
in the Latin forensis, to mean in open court or
public, but in generally usage refers to the use of
scientific methods to provide information about
crime (Sharp, 2020: 7; Weizman, 2017: 65).
Geographers have sought to utilise forensics in
studying, inter alia, retail location (Brodsky,
2003), geoscience (Morgan and Bull, 2007),
historical geography (De Vorsey, 1980) and
feminist geopolitics (Sharp, 2020). But despite
the common adoption of the term, we see a
divergence in understandings of forensics
within geographical research. For Brodsky
(2003: 250), forensic geography constitutes a
technical exercise comprising research ‘focused
on a specific case in which an opinion by an
expert witness is needed’. In this sense, foren-
sics points to the instrumental transfer of geo-
graphical knowledge and expertise from the
academic realm into legal disputes.
In contrast, critical and narrative accounts of
the incorporation of forensic approaches fore-
ground the almost oppositional arenas of foren-
sic evidence production from the field of peer
reviewed science. Rather than judgement of an
interpretation lying with other experts, the role
of the forensic scientist is to curate evidence that
will be persuasive within a legal setting. For
Morgan and Bull (2007: 44), the practice of
forensic geoscience rests on ‘personal opinions’
which are not peer-reviewed but rather ‘are
judged on general public understanding and
acceptance (by judge and jury) in a court of
law’. Most recently, Sharp (2020) has drawn
on the concept of forensics to assess the inter-
play of bodies, materials and representation in
the unfolding of geopolitics. For Sharp (2020:
10), forensics is a style of analysis that holds
together that which is often considered separate:
not least critical analysis of representation with
considerations of embodiment and more-than-
human agencies. In these circumstances, foren-
sics is helpful in ‘finding new possibilities for
feminist understandings of the ways in which
bodies and other materialities are caught up in
geopolitics’.
Alongside scholarly uses of the term foren-
sics, there has also been an increase in legal and
criminological investigations of the role,
approaches and implications of forensic sci-
ence. Some trace this interest to the prominence
of forensic science within popular culture, spe-
cifically the rise in popularity in 19th-Century
Europe and North America of Sherlock Holmes,
the fictional detective created by Arthur Conan
Doyle (see Harrington, 2007; Morgan and Bull,
2007). Conan Doyle’s stories tap into the late-
19th-century fascination with crime and ‘the
developing field of forensic science, drawing
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the reader into a model of investigation that
closely resembles medical diagnosis as they
play up the sensational melodrama in the crimes
that they feature’ (Harrington, 2007: 367).
There is a seductive certainty in this approach
to criminality and law, where the truth is often
singular, the path to its uncover linear and the
final outcome uncontested.
Jasanoff (1998: 716) illuminated precisely
this problem in her exploration of the relation-
ship between scientific and legal evidence,
where she argues that the dynamics of litigation
‘obscure the complexity of the translations by
which samples, artefacts, recordings or pictures
become evidence’. This complexity is illu-
strated through the example of DNA finger-
printing and in particular in the knowledge
controversies surrounding the use of DNA evi-
dence in identifying perpetrators of crime.
Jasanoff’s arguments emphasise the signifi-
cance of visualisation to acts of scientific trans-
lation, where the expert needs to render
technical evidence in a way that may be visua-
lised by judge and jury:
The expert witness and the examining lawyer col-
laborate to instruct, cajole, and rhetorically retrain
the fact-finder’s eyesight, with greater or lesser
success, to ‘see’ DNA and so, by metonymic
transfer of meaning, to perceive the truth whole.
(Jasenoff, 1998: 720)
Scientific evidence – in the court room as it is
in the laboratory or seminar room – thus became
the site of disagreement with contrasting asser-
tions as to the implications of the presence of
DNA. Consequently, Jasanoff (2012: 190) sug-
gests the experience with DNA evidence reveals
courts as better for ‘articulating than for defini-
tively resolving deconstructive questions about
scientific evidence’.
The focus on visualisation of forensic data
is also at the heart of Weizman’s (2017)
approach to the study of evidence. Weizman is
interested in the multiple ways in which visual
materials bear witness to past violence and the
corresponding question as to how this testimony
can be brought into legal deliberation. In con-
sidering the visual traces of violent acts – pic-
tures of the aftermath of assassinations, aerial
photographs of troop movements or images of
the architecture of the Holocaust – Weizman
introduces the notion of the ‘threshold of detect-
ability’ to draw attention to the role of image
resolution in setting the parameters of the detail
that may be captured in photographic evidence.
Unlike the randomly disturbed grains of analogue
photography, digital images, such as satellite
images, are divided into a grid of equal square
units, or pixels. The grid filters reality like a sieve
or fishing net. Objects larger than the grid are
captured and retained. Smaller ones pass through
and disappear. Objects close to the size of the
pixel are in a special threshold condition: whether
they are captured or not depends on the relative
skill, or luck, of the fisherman and the fish. (Weiz-
man, 2017: 27)
This sense of the arbitrariness of detectability
returns the discussion to the significance of
interpretation: that such material does not
equate to a positivist imagination of a graspable
external world that is unproblematically por-
trayed in visual imagery. Instead, it reminds us
of the painstaking work required to create evi-
dential narratives by piecing together available
imagery with corroboration from witness testi-
mony. While this is reminiscent of our starting
point of the MH17 investigation by Bellingcat,
Weizman (2017: 30) is keen to emphasise how
the threshold of detectability is differentially
situated depending on what part is played in the
violence. He uses the example of US drone
assassinations in the ‘war on terror’ to illustrate
how visual reach of the perpetrator is asym-
metric to the resources available to the
investigator:
The visual spectrum between the high resolution
used for killing and the low resolution available
for monitoring the killing is the space exploited
by deniers. The practice of counter forensics
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[ . . . ] has to engage a condition of structural
inequality in access to vision, signals and knowl-
edge, and to find ways to operate close to and
under the threshold of detectability.
In identifying the structural inequalities inher-
ent in the collation of evidence, we are reminded
once more of the latent politics of evidence pro-
duction: where unequal access to data allows the
erasure of violence while rules of admissibility
shape its presence within subsequent legal pro-
ceedings (see also Gregory, 2018).
VI Conclusion
My three progress reports have not been ‘about’
legal geography as a sub-discipline. There
already exists a fine and expansive set of writ-
ings that probe the limits and purpose of this
nebulous and plurally understood field of
inquiry and practice (Braverman et al., 2014;
Delaney, 2015, 2016, 2017; Robinson and Gra-
ham, 2018). Instead, I have sought to explore
the interface of geographical writing with cog-
nate disciplines around three aspects of legal
systems: court space, the enrolment of bodies
in law and, in this final report, to trace historical
and emerging work on the legal geographies of
evidence. This has been a set of discussions that
foreground the significance of the structural
characteristics of trial justice and in particular
issues of admissibility. Such debates illustrate
the necessarily relational nature of evidence: it
comes into being through its relevance to the
legal case, its persuasiveness is matter of inter-
pretation forged through its connection to the
facts of issue (relevance) and its characteristics
in relationship with other evidence (authentica-
tion and corroboration). But far from being a
technical adjudication, the research reviewed
here highlights how enduring landscapes of
power stemming from (in the cases reviewed
here) colonial and patriarchal histories shape the
admissibility and availability of evidence.
There is a timeliness to these considerations.
Currently, we are seeing a disequilibrium at
work: as the public availability of evidential
material increases, the opportunities to seek
legal redress are reduced. As has been reported,
the swathes of unfiltered data in social media
accounts, online investigative agencies and
mapping applications is democratising the prac-
tice of investigation, where narratives around
significant global events can be assembled
using investigative skills and Internet access.
But this requires spaces of deliberation where
such material can be assessed and considered
using agreed rules and norms. It is, after all,
material that bolsters Holocaust denial as much
as it reveals hidden mass atrocities. It is here that
we see an imbalance: just as there is a growth in
public intelligence gathering, the recording of
crime on social media and the rise in forensic
techniques, so does the possibility of adjudica-
tion in court become more remote. From with-
drawal from the International Criminal Court
through to restricted funding for trial justice
across the globe, we are seeing both an expan-
sion in interest in employing legal norms and
contraction of the democratic participation in
trial processes. In the gaps created, we see the
extrajudicial deliberation of evidence, an arena
where justice is not necessarily seen to be done.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Nick Gill and Francesca Moore
for reading earlier versions of this report. I have
benefitted from discussions with Tom Jackson,
Makoto Takahashi, Fiona McConnell and Katherine
Brickell. Thank you to Louise Amoore and Noel
Castree for their editorial advice and support. Errors
that remain are my own.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of inter-
est with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the







Bellingcat (2015) MH17 –The Open Source Evidence.
Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-
and-europe/2015/10/08/mh17-the-open-source-evi
dence/ (accessed 27 August 2020).
Bennett A and Layard L (2015) Legal geography: becoming
spatial detectives. Geography Compass 9(7): 406–422.
Blair CT (1990) Spencer v. commonwealth and recent
developments in the admissibility of DNA fingerprint
evidence. Virginia Law Review 76(4): 853–876.
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Brounéus K (2008) Truth-telling as talking cure? Insecur-
ity and retraumatization in the Rwandan Gacaca courts.
Security Dialogue 39(1): 55–76.
Brown J (2011) We mind and we care but have things
changed? Assessment of progress in reporting, investi-
gating and prosecution of rape. Journal of Sexual
Aggression 17(3): 263–272.
Butler J (2011) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Sub-
version of Identity. Abingdon: Routledge.
Calvert RW (1959) No evidence and insufficient evidence
points of error. Texas Law Review 38: 361.
Carson A (2014) Did Russian personnel help take down
MH17? Washington Post, 22nd July 2014. Available
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/07/22/did-russian-personnel-help-take-
down-mh17/ (accessed 27 August 2020).
Cheah WL (2019) Culture-specific evidence before inter-
nationalized criminal courts: lessons from Asian juris-
dictions. Journal of International Criminal Justice
17(5): 1031–1055.
Coundouriotis E (2013) You only have your word: rape
and testimony. Human Rights Quarterly 35: 365–385.
Cuomo D and Brickell K (2019) Feminist legal geogra-
phies. Environment and Planning A: Economy and
Space 51(5): 1043–1049.
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